By Lucy Komisar
Feb 8, 2026

Read this story in New York Times, a stunner: Seven Pages of a Sealed Watergate File Sat Undiscovered. Until Now.

Do you think “It Can’t Happen Here,” the plot of Sinclair Lewis’s novel about a fascist takeover of America?

The key point of the brilliant exposé by journalist James Rosen, about information which had been sealed for 50 years, is that President Richard Nixon testified under oath that the most serious threat to his presidency came not from political opponents or the media, but from a covert espionage operation run by the U.S. military’s top commanders—the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Rosen takes a long time to present a narrative that sets up the story, but (cut to the chase) here are the core revelations from the newly unsealed seven pages as he reports on the New York Times Oped page (note he is NOT a NYT staffer):

1. The “Deep State” Was Real and It Was Military: Nixon revealed that Yeoman Charles Radford was part of a systematic spy ring that stole thousands of top-secret documents from the National Security Council (NSC) for over a year and funneled them to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Thomas Moorer. This was an illegal domestic espionage operation within the White House itself.
2. Nixon Considered It Treasonous but Buried It: Nixon and his aides (Mitchell, Haldeman, Ehrlichman) viewed the Moorer-Radford affair as “a federal offense of the highest order” and akin to the plot of Seven Days in May (a novel about a military coup). However, they chose to cover it up to avoid:
   • Damaging the public image of the U.S. military.
   • Exposing other secret operations (like the Cambodia bombings or the China opening).
   • Triggering a constitutional crisis.
3. The Motive Was Policy Sabotage: The Joint Chiefs spied because they were deliberately excluded from Nixon and Kissinger’s key foreign policy decisions (détente with the USSR and China, Vietnamization, budget cuts). They used stolen information to resist and undermine policies they opposed.
4. It Directly Connects to Watergate: The “Plumbers” unit was initially formed to plug the leak that exposed this military spying (the Jack Anderson columns about the India-Pakistan war). The illegal activities of the Plumbers, born from this crisis, later metastasized into the Watergate break-in and cover-up.
5. Nixon’s Warning: In his 1975 testimony, Nixon explicitly warned the prosecutors not to “open that can of worms,” referring to the full story of the Joint Chiefs’ espionage. The prosecutors and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft agreed, classifying and sealing those seven pages to prevent the story from coming out.

In essence, the article argues that the most profound scandal of the Nixon era was not the Watergate burglary itself, but the previously concealed “criminal insubordination” by the nation’s highest military leaders—a true “deep state” operation that Nixon felt powerless to expose. The story draws a direct line from this historical episode to modern political discourse about the “permanent bureaucracy” or “deep state” undermining a sitting president.

Should any people involved in this be criminally indicted?

Why it’s highly unlikely and problematic

1. Statute of Limitations: For almost all federal crimes, the statute of limitations has long since expired (typically 5 years for most non-capital offenses). New charges could not be filed today.
2. Double Jeopardy and Official Investigations: Key figures were investigated by the Senate Armed Services Committee (1974) and the Watergate Special Prosecution Force (1975). While no criminal indictments resulted from the Moorer-Radford affair itself, the principle of not re-investigating closed matters is strong.
3. Death of Principals: Nearly every major figure involved is deceased:
   • Richard Nixon (died 1994)
   • Admiral Thomas Moorer (died 2004)
   • John Mitchell (died 1988)
   • H.R. Haldeman (died 1993)
   • John Ehrlichman (died 1999)
   • Alexander Haig (died 2010)
   • Henry Kissinger (died 2023)
   • Brent Scowcroft (died 2020)
   • Jack Anderson (died 2005)
4. Nixon’s Pardon: President Gerald Ford’s 1974 pardon of Nixon for “all offenses against the United States” he committed or may have committed would be an absolute legal barrier to prosecuting Nixon, even if he were alive.
5. National Security & “State Secrets” Defense: Any prosecution would have risked exposing highly classified information about the opening to China, the India-Pakistan war, and other sensitive operations—the very reason Nixon and others cited for covering it up. A court would likely dismiss a case on these grounds.
6. Historical, Not Legal, Resolution: The system, however imperfectly, dealt with this through non-criminal means: resignations (Nixon), transfers (Radford, Welander), and the political process. The historical record is now the primary forum for judgment.

Arguments For the Principle of Indictment (What the evidence might have supported in the 1970s):

If we could turn back the clock to 1973-75, and a full, aggressive prosecution had been pursued (which it wasn’t), here’s who might have faced charges and for what:

• Yeoman Charles Radford: Could have been charged with espionage (18 U.S.C. § 793(e) – unlawful removal and transmission of national defense information), theft of government property, and conspiracy. His confession and polygraph failure were strong evidence.
• Admiral Robert Welander (Radford’s direct supervisor): Conspiracy and solicitation to commit espionage/theft. The article states he confessed to passing documents to Moorer.
• Admiral Thomas Moorer (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs): The most complex case. Evidence suggests he received stolen documents. Charges could include being an accessory after the fact, misprision of a felony (concealing a known felony), or conspiracy. His defense would be command ambiguity and that he believed it was an authorized liaison.
• Alexander Haig: The article suggests he was “tacitly encouraged” the spying and was implicated by Welander. If proven, charges similar to Welander’s.
• Richard Nixon, John Mitchell, H.R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman: For their roles in the cover-up—not the spying itself. This could include obstruction of justice (for quashing the investigation), misuse of government resources (illegal wiretaps on Radford), and conspiracy. This is the same pattern that led to Nixon’s impeachment articles and the convictions of Mitchell, Haldeman, and Ehrlichman for Watergate-related cover-ups.

Conclusion

From a practical and legal standpoint today, criminal indictment is impossible and moot. Time, death, pardons, and expired statutes have closed the door.

However, the article’s central revelation is that a strong case for criminality existed at the time, involving the highest levels of the military and the White House, but was deliberately suppressed for reasons of political and national security expediency.

The question “Should they have been indicted?” is really a historical and moral one. The evidence suggests that if the rule of law had been applied equally, without fear of damaging the military’s reputation or exposing state secrets, several individuals could and perhaps should have faced a jury. The fact that they did not is a testament to the immense power of the institutions involved and the extreme lengths taken to avoid a crisis even graver than Watergate.

The story’s modern significance lies not in calling for belated indictments, but in illustrating how entrenched power structures can operate outside the law and how difficult it is to hold them accountable, even when the evidence is clear.

What does this say about the corruption of the US military

The revelations about the Moorer-Radford affair present a sobering case study in institutional corruption within the U.S. military’s highest ranks, though with important nuance. Here’s what this specific incident suggests about military corruption:

1. The Corruption Was Systemic, Not Just Individual

• This wasn’t a lone “bad apple” but an organized operation involving:
  • An enlisted spy (Radford) with extraordinary access
  • Mid-level officers directing him (Admiral Welander)
  • The highest-ranking military officer in the nation (Admiral Moorer) receiving the stolen intelligence
• The corruption served institutional goals: The Joint Chiefs felt excluded from policy-making and used illegal means to regain influence.

2. Motivation Was Policy Opposition, Not Personal Gain

• Unlike typical corruption (bribes, kickbacks), this was policy-driven insubordination.
• The Joint Chiefs opposed Nixon/Kissinger’s foreign policy (détente with China/USSR, Vietnam withdrawal) and believed their exclusion threatened national security.
• This represents a particularly dangerous form of corruption: officials breaking laws based on ideological conviction rather than personal greed.

3. Double Standard in Accountability

• Lower-ranking personnel (Radford) faced career destruction and surveillance.
• Senior officers (Moorer, Haig) suffered no legal consequences and maintained prestigious careers.
• Admiral Moorer retired with full honors despite what Nixon called “a federal offense of the highest order.”
• This demonstrates how institutional protection operates at the highest levels.

4. Civilian Leadership’s Complicity

• Nixon, Mitchell, Haldeman, and Ehrlichman knew about felony-level espionage but chose to cover it up.
• Their justifications—protecting military morale, avoiding scandal during wartime, preserving secret operations—illustrate how corruption becomes institutionalized when leaders prioritize organizational stability over rule of law.

5. The National Security “Card” Trumps All

• The affair shows how “national security” can be invoked to:
  • Justify illegal surveillance (wiretapping Radford and associates)
  • Prevent prosecution of clear crimes
  • Keep Congress and the public in the dark
• This creates a dangerous precedent: illegal acts become acceptable if framed as necessary for security.

6. Parallels to Contemporary Concerns

• The incident validates some “deep state” narratives: powerful bureaucracies can actively undermine elected leadership.
• However, it contradicts the common partisan framing: here, the “deep state” was hardline military conservatives sabotaging a Republican president’s foreign policy, not “liberal civil servants.”
• This suggests institutional corruption can emerge from any part of the bureaucracy when it feels threatened or ideologically opposed to leadership.

7. Institutional Self-Preservation Above All

• The military’s response prioritized protecting the institution’s reputation over accountability.
• The Senate Armed Services Committee’s whitewash (“not culpable”) suggests Congressional oversight can fail when confronting powerful institutions.
• This creates a dangerous cycle: institutions learn they can evade consequences if the scandal seems too damaging to expose fully.

8. The Limits of Reform

• Watergate led to significant intelligence reforms (FISA courts, Congressional oversight committees).
• Yet this specific military espionage scandal remained buried, suggesting some forms of institutional corruption are deemed “too big” to fully address.

Conclusion on U.S. Military Corruption:

The Moorer-Radford affair reveals a specific, troubling form of corruption: institutional insubordination justified by ideological conviction and protected by claims of national security necessity. It shows that:

1. The military is not monolithic—factions with different ideologies can engage in illegal activities to advance their vision.
2. Checks and balances can fail when civilian leaders fear confronting powerful institutions.
3. “National security” can become a shield for corruption rather than a genuine concern.
4. Historical accountability is often selective—the most powerful actors frequently escape consequences.

This case doesn’t suggest the entire military is corrupt, but it demonstrates how even venerable institutions can engage in systematic illegal activity when they perceive existential threats to their influence or worldview. The real corruption may be less about individual venality than about institutional self-preservation and ideological conviction overriding legal and constitutional boundaries.

The lesson isn’t that the military is uniquely corrupt, but that all powerful institutions—military, intelligence, political—require vigorous, transparent oversight and a culture where whistleblowing is protected rather than suppressed. The fact that this scandal remained buried for 50 years is perhaps the most damning evidence of all about how systemic corruption can be hidden.

The Pentagon for decades has refused to supply a financial audit mandated by Congress to tell what it does with the billions of dollars it receives. Money which could be financing the next projected coup. And many of members of Congress, of both parties, who ought to demand the audit are bought by arms dealers. Yes, it can happen here.